Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 85
Issue 4 Spring

Article 8

Spring 1995

Should Courts Instruct Juries as to the
Consequences to a Defendant of a Not Guilty by
Reason of Insanity Verdict
Randi Ellias

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
Recommended Citation
Randi Ellias, Should Courts Instruct Juries as to the Consequences to a Defendant of a Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity Verdict, 85 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 1062 (1994-1995)

This Supreme Court Review is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.

0091-4169/95/8504-1062
THE JOURNAL

OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY

Copyright © 1995 by Northwestern University, School of Law

Vol. 85, No. 4
Printed in U.S.A.

SHOULD COURTS INSTRUCT JURIES AS
TO THE CONSEQUENCES TO A
DEFENDANT OF A "NOT GUILTY BY
REASON OF INSANITY"
VERDICT?
Shannon v. United States,
114 S. Ct. 2419 (1994)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Shannon v. United States,1 the United States Supreme Court
held that under the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 (IDRA),
courts need not instructjuries on the consequences to defendants of a
verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI)."2 The Court first
held that the IDRAcontains no provision requiring such an instruction. 3 The Court also ruled that general federal practice did not mandate such an instruction. 4 This Note argues that the Court properly
held that the IDRA does not require such an instruction, even though
its legislative history implies that Congress envisioned that courts
would give it. This Note further argues that the absence of empirical
evidence indicating that jurors commonly misunderstand the nature
of an NGI verdict supports the Court's position that general federal
practice does not require the instruction. Finally, this Note contends
that the longstanding proscription against telling jurors the consequences of their verdict remains in the absence of empirical evidence
indicating that such an instruction might aid the defendant.
II.

BACKGROUND

To properly assess the Court's decision in Shannon v. United States,
it is necessary to examine three governing factors: the role of the jury
throughout history; the effect that the passage of the IDRA had on the
insanity defense; and various federal circuit court decisions regarding
instructing the jury on the legal consequences of an NGI verdict.

I

Shannon v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2419 (1994).
2 Id. at 2428.
3 Id. at 2425.
4

Id. at 2427.
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THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE ROLE OF THE JURY

The modem jury finds its roots in eleventh century England,
when courts initiated a practice of calling the defendant's neighbors
to testify about various facts of the case at bar.5 Eventually, courts began to ask these witnesses, known collectively as "the presenting jury,"
to determine whether the facts warranted a verdict of guilty or not
guilty.6 By the fourteenth century, the process had developed to the
point where the jury that returned the verdict (known as the "petit
jury") was different from the group of people who testified. 7 As a result, the jury's verdict became based not on the knowledge of its own
members, but on the knowledge of other witnesses. 8 For the first
time, the jury assumed its current role as the finder of fact. 9
The United States inherited the jury in this form from Great Britain. After the Revolutionary War, the Framers recognized the right to
trial by jury as fundamental to the protection of individual liberty.' 0
The Constitution embodies this recognition in the Sixth and Seventh
Amendments.1 1
At the time the Constitution was framed, however, the boundaries between the role of the jury and the role of the judge lacked clear
definition. Courts generally upheld the presumption that the jury
functioned solely as a factfinder, while the judge remained the arbiter
of the law. 12 At the same time, however, the judge commonly instructed juries that they possessed the right to determine the law as
well as the facts, and that they could reject the judge's determination
13
of the law.
In the mid-nineteenth century, courts began to curb this virtually
unfettered power of the jury with the use of such mechanisms as the
directed verdict and the special verdict. 14 Finally, the United States
Supreme Court, which had previously upheld the jury's power to decide both the facts and the law, ruled that in federal criminal cases the
5 RITA SIMON, THEJURW. ITS ROLE IN AzmucAN Socimy 5 (1980).
6 VALERIE P. HANs & NEIL VIDMAR,JUDGING THE JURY 27 (1986).
7 Id.

8 Id. at 28.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 36.

11 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (" In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to... [a trial] by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed.. . ."); U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In suits at common law ....
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States ...
12 HAs & VIDMAR, supra note 6, at 38.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 39.
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jury ought to accept the judge's instructions on the law.' 5 Thus, while
the jury still had the ability to disregard its instructions without fear of
punishment, it no longer possessed the Court's sanction to do S0.16
This view of the proper disposition ofjudicial power between the
judge and the jury persists today. Under this formulation, the legal
consequences of a particular verdict are a question of law, within the
exclusive province of the judge.
B.

FEDERAL COURTS ON THE COMMITMENT INSTRUCTION PRE-IDRA

Prior to the passage of the IDRA in 1984, most federal jurisdictions did not distinguish a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity"
from their standard "not guilty" verdict. 17 Thus, someone found NGI
received the same treatment under the law as someone found simply
"not guilty." These jurisdictions generally refused to allow courts to
tell the jury the legal consequences to the defendant of an NGI
8
verdict.1
When explaining their refusal to give such an instruction, most
courts invoked a similar rationale-that the jury lacked any role in
sentencing and, therefore, should not take sentencing into account
when reaching a verdict. 19 Moreover, courts feared that an instruction regarding the legal consequences to the defendant of any verdict
would distract the jury from its factfinding role and invite compromise
verdicts. 20 Such a verdict might arise when ajury returns a verdict of
not guilty in a case in which the prosecution has clearly met its burden
of proof, simply because the jury feels that the defendant does not
deserve as harsh a punishment as the law prescribes. 2 1 This fear of
compromise verdicts, as well as the desire to maintain a clearly defined division of labor between the judge and the jury, prompted
courts to refuse to give an instruction regarding the sentencing ramifications of any verdict.
The refusal to instruct the jury about the consequences of an NGI
verdict actually worked to the defendant's advantage in most federal
jurisdictions. As stated, with the exception of the law of the District of
Columbia, no federal law provided for an NGI verdict separate from
15 Id. at 40 (citing Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895)).
16 Id.
17 Joseph P. Liu, Note, FederalJury Instructions and the Consequences of a Successful Insanity
Defense, 93 COLUM. L. Rav. 1223, 1229 (1993).
18 See Pope v. United States, 298 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1962).
19 See Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 38 (1975); United States v. McCracken, 488
F.2d 406, 423 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Borum, 464 F.2d 896, 901 (10th Cir. 1972).
20 Pope, 298 F.2d at 508.
21 Liu, supra note 17, at 1228. This phenomenon is also known as "jury nullification."
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the more standard verdict of "not guilty."22 Furthermore, no federal
statute allowed the trial court to mandate commitment for an NGI
acquittee. 23 Rather, the states had to pursue separate civil commit24
ment procedures against the NGI acquittee.
NGI acquittees often went free because the federal courts and the
state courts generally allocated the burden of proof of insanity differently.25 To meet the burden under federal law, the accused often
needed only to create a reasonable doubt as to their sanity.26 State
commitment procedures, however, generally required affirmative
proof of insanity.2 7 Because of the disparity, an NGI acquittee might
offer enough evidence of insanity to satisfy the federal requirement,
without providing enough evidence to enable the prosecution to trigger the state's commitment procedures. Thus, the NGI acquittee
might escape institutionalization. The prohibition against informing
juries of the consequences of a successful insanity plea, therefore, protected defendants. It foreclosed the possibility that the prosecution
would play on the jurors' fears that a dangerous person would gain
immediate release into society to gain a conviction.
Unlike the other federal jurisdictions, the District of Columbia
did statutorily mandate commitment procedures following the return
of an NGI verdict. 28 This precluded the possibility that an NGI acquittee might gain immediate release. Not surprisingly, the District of Columbia courts held different beliefs about the propriety of telling the
jury the consequences of that verdict. In Lyles v. United States,2 9 the
D.C. Court of Appeals held that courts should always inform the jury
that an NGI verdict led to the defendant's involuntary commitment,
unless the defendant affirmatively indicated that he did not wish the
court to the give instruction.3 0 In so holding, the court acknowledged
the familiar rule that the jury should not concern itself with the consequences of its verdict.3 1 The court found persuasive, however, the argument that jurors did not hold a common understanding of the
nature of an NGI verdict 3 2 The court professed that the jury had a
22

See Borum, 464 F.2d at 900.

23 Id. at 901; McCracken, 488 F.2d at 422; United States v. Portis, 542 F.2d 414, 421 (7th

Cir. 1976).
24 Liu, supranote 17, at 1228.
25 Henry T. Miller, Comment, Recent Changes in Criminal Law: The FederalInsanity Defense, 46 L L. Ray. 337, 353 (1985).
26 Id. at 354.
27 Id. at 358-54.
28

D.C.

CODE

ANN.§ 24-301 (1981).

29 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
30
31

Id. at 729.
Id. at 728.

32 Id.

356 U.S. 961 (1957).
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right to understand the insanity verdict in the same manner as it understood the verdicts of "not guilty" and "guilty."33 Unlike court opinions from jurisdictions which refused to instruct the jury as to the
consequences of an NGI verdict, the opinion in Lyles failed to mention any concern about fairness tW the defendant.
THE INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM ACT OF

C.

1984

Congress passed the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 4 in
response to virulent criticism of the insanity defense emanating from
the John Hinckley trial. 35 The Act embodied a number of changes to
the existing federal law. First, the Act provided a new standard for
insanity, allowing defendants to offer, as an affirmative defense, evidence that at the time they committed the crime, they were unable to
appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions.3 6 This construction
eliminated the alternative "irresistible impulse" prong of the test previously followed by some jurisdictions, whereby defendants might
prove insanity by offering evidence that even though they appreciated
the wrongfulness of their actions, they nevertheless lacked the ability
37
to conform their behavior to the law.
Second, the Act shifted the burden of persuasion from the prosecution to the defendants, who then had to prove their insanity by
clear and convincing evidence.3 8 This differed from previous federal
guidelines, which required the defendant simply to raise the insanity
defense, triggering a burden on the prosecution to prove the defend39
ant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.

Further, the Act provided for a verdict of "not guilty by reason of
insanity" in addition to the two traditionally accepted verdicts of guilty
and not guilty.40 Previous law, as discussed, subsumed an NGI verdict
into the umbrella "not guilty" category.
Finally, the IDRA set forth a federal procedure for commitment
of defendants found NGI. 41 This aspect of the Act addressed perhaps

the most serious loophole in pre-IDRA federal law-the possibility
that the defendant might escape commitment because of the disparities between the federal and state evidentiary requirements for proof
33 Id.
34 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 17, 4241-47 (1984).
35 See RITAJ. SIMON & DAVID E. AARONSON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: A CRrrIcAL ASSESSMENT OF LAW AND POLIc IN THE POST-HINCKLEY ERA 45-47 (1988).
36 Id. at 49.
37 Id.

38
39
40
41

Id. at 59.
Id. at 58-59.
Id. at 55.
Id.
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of insanity.
D.

FEDERAL JURISDICI1ONS ON THE COMMITMENT INSTRUCTION AFTER
THE PASSAGE OF THE IDRA.

The text of the IDRA does not indicate whether the trial court
judge ought to instruct the jury on the consequences of an NGI verdict. The following statement in the legislative history of the statute,
however, indicates that Congress gave judges the discretion to provide
the instruction:
The Committee endorses the procedure used in the District of Columbia whereby the jury, in a case in which the insanity defense has been
raised, may be instructed on the effect of a verdict of not guilty by reason
of insanity. If the defendant requests that the instruction not be given, it
is within the discretion of the court whether to give it or not.42
Nevertheless, this statement loses some of its force since Congress
did not include a similar provision in the text of the Act. The several
federal jurisdictions that considered the question were split on
whether judges should instruct juries about the consequences to the
defendant of an NGI verdict. Generally, courts that grant little weight
to legislative history refused the instruction, instead abiding by the
traditional rule that the jury should not allow the consequences of its
verdict to influence its deliberation. Courts that chose to employ legislative history as a tool for statutory interpretation often required the
instruction.
In United States v. Frank,43 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the court should not give the instruction.44 In Frank,the defendant was convicted of second degree murder, assault with intent to
commit murder, and use of a firearm in commission of a crime of
violence. 45 Frank appealed his convictions, basing his appeal in part
on the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury as to the consequences
of an NGI verdict.46
In affirming Frank's conviction, the Ninth Circuit relied on the
longstanding belief that supplying juries with sentencing information
both distracts them from their function as factfinders and leads to
compromise verdicts. 47 The court further refused to give force to the
42 S. REP. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 240 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C-A.N.
3182, 3422.
43 956 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 113 S. Ct. 363 (1991).
44 Id. at 882.

45 Id. at 873-74. Respectively, these convictions recognized violations of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1111 and 1153; 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a) and 1153; 18 U.S.C. §§ 924 (c) and 1153.
46 Frank,956 F.2d at 878.
47 Id. at 879.
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above cited statement of Congressional intent.48 It declared that legislative history played a role in statutory interpretation only when the
statute contained ambiguities. Since the IDRA failed entirely to speak
on the subject of jury instructions, legislative history did not apply in
this situation.49
The Eleventh Circuit employed similar reasoning in United States
v. Thigpen.50 The defendant in Thigpenwas convicted of illegal possession of a firearm after a felony conviction. 5 1 Again, the court refused
to instruct the jury that the defendant would face involuntary commit52
ment if found NGI.

The court in Thigpen raised a number of arguments in support of
its holding. First, it pointed out that the IDRA fails to address the
issue of ajury instruction regarding the consequences of an NGI verdict.58 Second, it rejected defendant's argument that the instruction
was necessary to correctjurors' possibly mistaken beliefs about the disposition of an NGI acquittee. 5 4 The court reasoned that the instruction would simply serve to draw jurors' attention away from their
factfinding responsibilities. 5 5 The court further found the fact that
the IDRA provided for mandatory commitment procedures irrelevant
55
to its decision.
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit raised the point that jurors are presumed to follow the court's instructions, which often include an admonition that the jury should not consider the possible consequences
of its verdict during its deliberation. 57 The court stated that defendant's argument that the instruction was necessary to counter the jury's
mistaken beliefs about the ramifications of an NGI verdict implied
that jurors commonly violated this instruction. 58 The court was unwilling to lend credence to this implication. 59
Both the Ninth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit, however, recogId. at 881.
See id.
4 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1993).
51 Id. at 1575.
52 Id. at 1578.
53 Id. at 1576.
54 Id. at 1577.
55 Id. (citing Pope v. United States, 298 F.2d 507, 508 (5th Cir. 1962)).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 1578.
58 Id.
59 Id.; see also Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987).
The rule that juries are presumed to follow their instructions is a pragmatic one,
rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in the belief
that it represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the interests of the state
and the defendant in the criminal justice process;
48
49
50
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nized the necessity for a curative instruction when either the prosecutor or a witness stated, in the presence of the jury, that a defendant
found NGI would be immediately released into society. 60 The Ninth
Circuit, in Evalt v. United States,6 1 was the first to recognize this need
for a curative instruction. In Evalt, a prosecutor told the jury that if it
found the defendant NGI, he would "walk out of this courtroom a free
man." 62 The Ninth Circuit determined that this was an inaccurate

statement of the applicable law, since the defendant fell under the
jurisdiction of the Navy which would transfer him to a naval hospital
for post-trial psychiatric treatment. 63 Further, the court held that the
proscription against informing jurors as to the consequences of verdicts applied to prosecutors as well as defendants. 64 In other words,
prosecutors could no more use the consequences of an NGI verdict to
frighten jurors into conviction than defendants could use the information to allay jurors' fears.
The Eighth Circuit came to a different conclusion in United States
v. NeavilL65 In Neavill, the defendant had been convicted of threatening to take the life of the President, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 871 (a).66 Neavill appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in not
informing the jury of the consequences of an NGI verdict.6 7 Following the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit in Lyles, the Eighth Circuit
agreed that courts should give such an instruction to ensure jurors'
understanding of the verdict.6 8 Further, the court stated that since
courts grounded their previous refusals to give the instruction in the
possibility that an NGI acquittee might evade commitment, the
change in the availability of federal commitment procedures supported giving the instruction. 69 The court further found the legislative history of the IDRA, endorsing the jury instruction, highly
70
persuasive.
Finally, a third line of reasoning about instructing the jury as to
the legal consequences of an NGI verdict arose after the passage of
the IDRA. This line advocated leaving the decision whether to give
60
61
62
63
64

United States v. Thigpen, 4 F.3d 1753, 1578 (11th Cir. 1993).
359 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1966).
Id. at 545.
Id. at 546.
Id.

65 868 F.2d 1000 (8th Cir.), vacated upon granting of reh'g en bane, 877 F.2d 1394 (8th
Cir.), appeal dismissed at defendant's request, 886 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
66 Id. at 1001.

67 Id. at 1002.
68 Id. at 1004-05.
69 Id. at 1004.

70 Id.
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the instruction to the discretion of the trial court.7 1 In United States v.
Blume, the jury convicted the defendant of conspiracy to manufacture
marijuana, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and interstate travel in furtherance of illegal activity. 72 Again, the defendant
appealed based on the trial judge's refusal to instruct the jury as to the
consequences of an NGI verdict. 73 The Second Circuit noted that the
IDRA did not explicitly require the instruction and that other courts
interpreting the statute usually refused the instruction.7 4 However,
the court relied on the legislative history discussed earlier and held
that the Act permitted such an instruction, at the discretion of the
trial judge. 75
The Blume opinion is interesting in that it contains two concurring opinions, both of which further discuss the rationale behind allowing the instruction. The first concurrence, by Judge Newman,
asserts that the trial judge should always give the instruction unless the
defendant requests otherwise. 76 Judge Newman cited the changes in
federal commitment procedures as negating the previous rationale
behind the refusal to give the instruction. 77 Further, he expressed
concern about possible wrongful convictions that might result from
keeping the knowledge of mandatory hospitalization of NGI acquittees from jurors.78
Judge Winters' concurrence, on the other hand, stated his belief
that judges should not routinely give the instruction. 79 Nevertheless,
he agreed that a curative instruction might be necessary when the trial
judge believed that a particular jury harbored the erroneous belief
that the defendant would gain immediate release following an NGI
verdict.8 0
The Third Circuit adopted Judge Winters' reasoning in United
States v. Fisher8' The court also stated, however, that if jurors fear a
particular defendant's release greatly enough that they are willing to
disregard their oaths and convict him rather than return a verdict of
NGI, they would likely not find reassurance in anything short of a
71 United States v. Fisher, 10 F.3d 115, 121 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Blume, 967
F.2d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1992).
72 Blume 967 F.2d at 46-47.
73 Id. at 49.
74 Id.

75 Id.

76 Id. at 50 (Newman, J., concurring).
77 Id. at 50-53 (Newman, J., concurring).
78 Id. (Newman, J., concurring).
79 Id. at 53 (Winter, J., concurring).
80 Id. at 54 (Winter, J., concurring).
81 10 F.3d 115, 121 (3d Cir. 1993).
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promise that the defendant would undergo a lengthy commitment period.8 2 Since the IDRA mandates only a forty-day commitment period, with the trial court reassessing hospitalization at that point, the
instruction might not serve its intended purpose.83
Thus, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Shannon,84 the
federal circuits recognized a tension between the desire to protect defendants from wrongful verdicts and the need to discourage juries
from returning compromise verdicts. The Supreme Court resolved
this conflict in favor of the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits' approach.
III.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

During the early morning hours of 25 August 1990, Sergeant
Marvin Brown of the Tupelo Police Department stopped Terry Lee
Shannon as he walked down a city street.8 5 The officer asked Shannon, a convicted felon then on parole, to accompany him to the police station to speak with a detective.8 6 Shannon told Brown that he
did not want to live anymore.8 7 He then walked across the street, took
a pistol from his coat, and shot himself in the chest 8 8 Shannon survived his suicide attempt and was subsequently indicted for unlawful
possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) (1).89
Shannon had taken possession of the pistol from his son earlier
that day.90 He claimed that his son had intended to go through airport security with the gun, and he had taken the pistol so that his son
would not "get into trouble."9 1 Shannon maintained that he intended
to leave the gun at his mother's house until he could safely turn it
over to his parole officer.9 2 Apparently, Shannon had previously deliv93
ered a shotgun to his parole officer in this fashion.
At his trial, Shannon raised the insanity defense. 9 4 Two clinical
psychologists, one appointed by Shannon and one appointed by the
82 Id. at 122.
83 Id.
84 United States v. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. 2419 (1994).
85 United States v. Shannon, 981 F.2d 759, 760 (5th Cir. 1993).
86 Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2423. The record does not specify why the detective wished to
speak with Shannon.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.

90 Brief for Petitioner at 4, United States v. Shannon, 114 S. Ct. 2419 (1994) (No. 92-

8346).
Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2423.
91
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United States, testified to Shannon's state of mind. 95 They agreed
that Shannon suffered from mental illness both at the time of the offense and at the time of trial, although they differed in the diagnoses
96
assigned to Shannon's condition.
At the close of testimony, Shannon asked the court to instruct the
jury that he would be involuntarily committed if the jury should return a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI)."97 Shannon's
request arose out of his fear that, without this instruction, the jury
might mistakenly believe that he would be immediately released into
society, and thus the jury might return a guilty verdict simply to forestall this possibility. The district court refused his request, instead instructing the jury that it should not allow the legal consequences of its
verdict to influence its decision. 98 The jury found Shannon guilty.99
Shannon appealed his conviction to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 10 0 He argued that the district court's
refusal to give the requested instruction was clear error in light of the
IDRA. 1 1 Shannon claimed that the IDRA mandated, or at least authorized, an instruction informing juries of the consequences of an
10 2
NGI verdict.
The Fifth Circuit held that the district court acted properly in
refusing the proposed instruction. 0 3 It first rejected the proposition
that the IDRA mandated a jury instruction regarding the consequences of an NGI verdict to the defendant 0 4 In so holding, the
court stated that the IDRA contained no explicit provision countermanding the traditional principle that ajury should not concern itself
with the consequences of its verdict. 05 The court expressed its reluctance to tamper with the traditional view that the jury functions solely
to determine guilt or innocence and has no sentencing role.' 0 6 And
95 Petitioner's Brief at 4, Shannon (No. 92-8346).
96 Id. Specifically, the government's psychologist diagnosed organic delusional brain
disorder, while defendant's psychologist diagnosed schizophrenia. Id. at 7.
97 Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2423. The desired instruction read as follows:
In the event it is your verdict that [Shannon] is not guilty only by reason of insanity,
... [you] should know that it is required that the court commit [Shannon] to a suitable hospital facility until such time as [he] does not pose a substantial risk of bodily
injury to another or serious damage to the property of others.
Petitioner's Brief at 18, Shannon (No. 92-8346).
98 Id.
99 Id.

100 Id.

1O1 United States v. Shannon, 981 F.2d 759, 763 (5th Cir. 1993).
102
103
104
105
106

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

765.
763.
763.
762.
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since the IDRA contains no Congressional mandate specifically requiring courts to inform juries that an NGI verdict would lead to the involuntary commitment of the defendant, the jury has no need to
understand the legal consequences of its verdict. 07
Shannon next argued that the legislative history of the IDRA indicated that the Senate Committee endorsed, and therefore authorized,
a procedure allowing courts to instruct the jury on the legal consequences of an NGI verdict if the defendant requests it.108 The appellate court conceded that the legislative history did show such an
endorsement. 0 9 The Fifth Circuit, however, citing BEWv.NLRB, 10
asserted that the Committee Report had no effect on its reading of
the JDRA."' The court reasoned that committee reports, while useful
in interpreting ambiguous language in a statute, did not have the
force of law.'1 2 Moreover, the IDRA did not contain ambiguous language in need of interpretation.' 1 3 Finally, the court maintained that
it lacked authority to enforce principles obtained from legislative history when that history failed to correspond to a specific statutory
11 4
clause.
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari" 5 to
determine whether either the IDRA or general federal practice requires a federal district court to instruct the jury regarding the conse6
quences of a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity.""
IV.
A.

SUMMARY OF OPINIONS

THE MAJORITY OPINION

In an opinion authored by Justice Thomas," 7 the Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit." 8
The Court held that neither the IDRA nor general federal practice
requires courts to instruct ajury as to the consequences to the defendant of a verdict of NGI." 9 The Court acknowledged an exception to
107 Id. at 764.
108 Id. at 763.

109 Id.

110 814 F.2d 697, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
111 Shannon, 981 F.2d at 763.
112 Id. at 764.

Id. at 768.
Id. at 764.
115 114 S. Ct. 380 (1993).
116 Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2421.
117 ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg joined justice Thomas' opinion.
118 Shannon, 114 S.Ct. at 2422.
'19 Id.
13
114

1074

SUPREME COURT REV1EW

[Vol. 85

this general rule in cases where the jury was specifically given a false
impression of the ramifications of an NGI verdict.' 20 The Court postulated a situation in which a prosecutor or a witness, in the presence
of the jury, asserts that the defendant would "go free" if found NGI.12 1
In such a situation, the Court noted that a district court might give an
instruction to counter the misstatement. 2 2 Shannon's case fell
outside this exception, however, since no evidence suggested that an
erroneous statement had been made during his trial.123 As a result,
the Court affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit. 24
Justice Thomas first stated the common premise that juries
should not consider the consequences of their verdicts. 2 5 He professed that this general principle arises out of ideas concerning the
proper division of labor between the jury and the judge-the jury
functions to find facts and reach a verdict; the judge takes that verdict
and imposes a sentence.' 2 6 Justice Thomas further asserted that supplying the jury with sentencing information not only serves no relevant purpose, but actually encourages the jury to consider matters
outside its realm, distracting it from its factfinding responsibilities and
127
confusing it as to its role in the judicial process.
Justice Thomas rejected Shannon's argument that the IDRA requires a jury instruction explaining the consequences of an NGI verdict.1 28 He first pointed to the text of the Act, which refers to jury
instructions only when it describes the possible verdicts which a jury
might return. 12 9 The Court reiterated the Fifth Circuit's explanation
that the text itself gives no indication that courts should tell jurors the
ramifications of their particular verdicts.' 3 0
Second, the Court rejected Shannon's argument that because
Congress modeled the IDRA on a D.C. statute, Congress implicitly
adopted that jurisdiction's construction of the statute.' 3 ' The Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit construed its insanity defense statute in
Lyles,' 32 in which the court endorsed the practice of instructing the
120 Id. at 2428.

121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.

125 Id. at 2424.
126 Id.
127 Id.

128 Id. at 2425.
129 Id.

130 Id.
131 Id. at 2424. Shannon relied on Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 36 (1899), for
this argument.
132 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961 (1957). See supra notes
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jury as to the consequences of an NGI verdict-'3 3 Justice Thomas asserted that this canon of interpretation served merely as a presumption of legislative intention, which failed when Congress varied the
IDRA from the original D.C. statute in several significant ways.' 3 4
The Court also dismissed Shannon's argument that the legislative
history of the IDRA clarified Congress' intent to adopt the procedure
set forth in Lyles.' 35 Adopting the logic of the Fifth Circuit, Justice
Thomas reiterated that legislative history plays a part in statutory interpretation only when the language "of the statute itself contains
36
ambiguities.'
The Court additionally refused to lend credence to Shannon's
final argument that general federal criminal practice required the
court to give the instruction. 137 Essentially, Shannon argued that unlike with verdicts of "innocent" and "guilty," jurors have no general
understanding of the nature of an NGI verdict. 13 8 Jurors may hold
the mistaken impression that a defendant who is found NGI is immediately released into society.13 9 This mistaken impression, coupled
with a fear that the defendant poses a threat to the public, may tempt
jurors to return a guilty verdict in situations where an NGI verdict is
more appropriate. 4
Justice Thomas contested the statement thatjurors do not understand the meaning of an NGI verdict.14 ' He declared that the media
has educated the public about the insanity defense to the point that
the public had the same basic understanding of an NGI verdict as it
does of the more "traditional" verdicts of "guilty" and "not guilty". 14 2
Justice Thomas further asserted that jurors are instructed to reach
their verdict with no consideration of punishment or penalty. 14 3
Thus, a mistaken impression as to the consequences of a verdict
should have no effect on the jury's decision.' 4 4 For these reasons, the
28 to 33 and accompanying text.
Shannon, 114 S. Ct. at 2424.
Id. at 2425. Variations between the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 and the
D.C. analog include: different standards of proof the defendant must meet to prove insanity, different periods of mandatory commitment, and different standards used to determine when an NGI acquittee might be released from hospitalization.
'35 Id. at 2426.
136 Id.
'37 Id. at 2427. The Fifth Circuit did not address this argument in its opinion.
133
134

138 Id.
'39 Id.
140 Id.
141

Id. at n.10

142 Id.
143 Id.

144 Id. The Court also addressed the possibility that the proposed instruction might
backfire, given that the IDRA mandates only a 40 day commitment period. Given the short
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Court adhered to the general tenet that district courts should not instruct juries as to the consequences of their verdicts, except in cases
where an event at trial creates an erroneous impression as to those
consequences.
B.

JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT

Writing for the dissent,1 4 5 Justice Stevens noted that prior to the
passage of the IDRA, no jurisdiction other than the District of Columbia followed a statutorily mandated commitment procedure for NGI
acquittees. 146 He argued that without such a commitment procedure,
district courts properly refused to instruct the jury as to the legal consequences of an NGI verdict because of the strong possibility that an
NGI acquittee would indeed "go free."' 47 Thus, the refusal to instruct
jurors in such situations protected defendants from improper verdicts
returned by fearful juries. 148
Justice Stevens went on to argue, however, that with the passage
of the IDRA, the jurors' fears that an NGI verdict would lead to the
defendant's immediate release became groundless. 149 The refusal to
instruct as to the consequences of an NGI verdict now not only failed
to protect defendants, but actually harmed them by failing to disabuse
jurors of the erroneous belief that an NGI acquittee gained immediate
release. 150 Justice Stevens maintained that it made no sense to adhere
to a rule designed to protect defendants' rights when, due to the pas51
sage of the IDRA, the rule actually hindered its original purpose.'
Justice Stevens pointed to the legislative history of the IDRA, as
did Shannon, to show that the legislature had fully intended the Lyles
procedure to apply to all federal courts, protecting defendants from
this danger. 152 Further, Justice Stevens proclaimed that "elementary
notions of fairness" require that the court provide a clarifying instruction in circumstances where jurors might be operating under false as55
sumptions about the nature of an NGI verdict.'
commitment period, ajury might return a guilty verdict in a case where an NGI verdict was
appropriate if it felt that the particular defendant was a danger to the public. Id. Finally,
the Court offered a "slippery slope" argument, stating that there is no way to limit the
availability of instructions regarding the legal consequences of a verdict solely to cases in-

volving an NGI defense. Id. at 2428.
145 Justice Blackmun joined in the dissent.
146 Shannon, 114 S. C. at 2429 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149 See id. at 2430 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
150 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152 Id. at 2429 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153 Id. at 2430 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justice Stevens also disputed the majority's argument that an instruction regarding the consequences of an NGI verdict would distract
jurors from their factfinding responsibilities.TM On the contrary, Justice Stevens contended that the instruction might free jurors from
their apprehensions regarding punishment or penalty, allowing them
to focus more closely on the task at hand. 155 The dissent concluded
by stating that even if the jury already knew the consequences of an
NGI verdict due to media exposure, as argued by the majority, no
156
harm could ensue by repeating the information.
V.
A.

ANALvsis

OVERVIEW

While Shannon illuminates important concerns about fairness to
defendants pleading NGI, none of the petitioner's arguments urging
courts to instruct the jury about the consequences to the defendant of
an NGI verdict survive scrutiny. Shannon first argued that the legislative history of the IDRA compelled an instruction on the consequences to defendants of an NGI verdict. The Court's refusal to rely
on the legislative history of the IDRA comports with its previous decisions regarding the role of legislative history in statutory interpretation. In general, the Court does not rely on legislative history unless
the language of the statute in question is ambiguous. Further, Congress might easily have included a requirement to instruct in the text
of the statute, but chose not to do so. Thus, the instruction is not
strictly required under the IDRA.
Second, petitioner's argument that jurors misunderstand the nature of an NGI verdict finds no support in empirical studies. While it
appears true that the media distorts the perception of the insanity defense,157 jurors apparently make a concerted effort to put aside their
preconceived notions about the insanity defense when they enter the
jury box.
Given the fact that empirical studies fail to show that juries base
154 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).

155 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156 Id. at 2431 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157 Eric Silver et al., Demythologizing InaccuratePerceptionsof the Insanity Defens, 18 .Aw&
HUM. BEHAV. 63, 67-68 (1994) (discussing media distortion in terms of the level of use and
success of the defense. For example, the public believes that 37% of felony indictments
result in an insanity plea, whereas the reality is that only 0.9% of felony indictments yield
that result. The public also believes that the average length of confinement for an NGI
acquittee is 21.8 months; the actual average is 32.5 months for all crimes; 76.4 months for
murder in particular. Finally, the public overestimatis the success of the plea, believing
that 44% of insanity pleas result in acquittal. Actually, only 26% of insanity pleas are
successful).
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their verdicts on incorrect assumptions about the law, it seems premature to overturn traditional notions about the function of the jury.
Two basic principles are at risk. First, there is a longstanding reluctance to give the jury information that might encourage compromise
verdicts. In other words, judges are fearful that juries will base verdicts on their impression of the particular defendant rather than on
the objective factor of whether the prosecution has met its burden in
proving the particular crime at issue. Second, there is some concern
that providing the jury with sentencing information disrupts the delicate balance between the roles of the judge and of the jury in the
American legal system.
The question of jury nullification addresses the same issue of
whether juries should take the consequences of their verdicts into account when making their decisions. Jury nullification occurs when
the jury ignores the law in a particular case, instead basing its decision
on a consideration of which verdict will produce a desired outcome.
The prohibition ofjury nullification first expressed in Spaf & Hansen
v. United States158 answers that question in the negative. The disapproval of jury nullification arises from the basic notion that cases involving identical violations of the same law ought to produce identical
outcomes. When the jury takes nonfactual information into account,
including subjective opinions about the proper outcome for a particular defendant, the system becomes more arbitrary. In denying the instruction Shannon desired, the Court expressed its fear that such an
instruction would encourage the jury to.return a verdict based on
whether it felt a particular defendant more properly belonged in
prison or in a mental institution. Thus, the holding in Shannon is entirely consistent with the general proscription against encouraging jurors to consider the consequences of their verdicts when making their
findings of fact.
The second general principle at risk in Shannon involves the
proper roles of the jury and the judge. The jury has long held the
role of factfinder, charged with reaching a conclusion about what
events actually transpired in a particular case. The judge, on the
other hand, instructs the jury on the law. Technically, the jury must
only apply the law to the facts to reach a conclusion. As stated, cases
with identical facts should result in identical verdicts. Instructing the
jury about the ramifications of particular verdicts might highlight an
area that the jury should not consider. Thus, identical cases might
come out differently, depending on whether the defendant elicited
the sympathy of the jury. The jury would be creating its own law, mix158 156 U.S. 51 (1895). See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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ing up the roles assigned to jurors and judges.
B.

THE TEXT OF THE IDRA

In Capital Traction Co. v. Hof 15 9 the Supreme Court ruled that
"whenever Congress . . . has borrowed from the statutes of a State

provisions which had received in that state a known and settled construction before their enactment by Congress, that construction must
be deemed to have been adopted by Congress together with the text
which it expounded...

160

The Supreme Court later narrowed this

holding, stating that this presumption varied in strength depending
on the similarity in the statutes' language, the character of the decisions in the jurisdiction from which Congress adapted the provision,
and other evidence of intention of the jurisdiction that borrowed the
statute. 16 1
Shannon argued that the Capital Traction precept of statutory
construction required the Court to accept the decision of the D.C.
Circuit in Lyles, which obligated a judge to instruct the jury on the
consequences of an NGI verdict. 162 However, the Court in Lyles does
not ground its holding in the text of D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301 and
cites no provision which requires ajury instruction. In fact, the D.C.
statute contains no provision which speaks to the issue ofjury instructions. Rather, the court frames its holding in terms of what the jury
"has a right to know," 16 3 basing its conclusion on the nebulous concept of fairness.
Given this, Congress could not possibly have modeled its provision aboutjury instructions on an analogous provision in the D.C. statute. Nor was Congress bound to accept the notions of fairness
espoused in the Lyles decision.
Furthermore, the IDRA alters the D.C. statute in several important ways. The IDRA strictly defines insanity as the inability to appreciate the wrongfulness of one's actions. 164 In contrast, the D.C. statute
allows for two manifestations of insanity-the inability to appreciate
the nature of one's acts or the inability to conform one's actions to
the law. Furthermore, the IDRA requires defendants to prove their
insanity by "clear and convincing" evidence, 16 5 while the D.C. analog
159 174 U.S. 1 (1899).

160

Id.

161 Carolene Prods., Co. v. United States, 823 U.S. 18, 26 (1944).
162 Shannon, 981 F.2d 759, 763 (5th Cir. 1993).
163 Lyle, 254 F.2d at 728.
164 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (1984).
165 18 U.S.C. § 17(b) (1984).
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requires only a preponderance of the evidence. 166
These differences suggest that Congress modeled the IDRA on
the D.C. statute only to the extent that Congress created uniform federal guidelines for insanity pleas and for post-trial treatment of the
NGI acquittee. Recognizing that the D.C. statute did not provide suitable guidelines, Congress drafted the IDRA to attain more desirable
results. In other words, Congress intentionally changed section 24301 because that statute failed to accurately reflect the goals Congress
wished to achieve through the IDRA. Thus, the D.C. Circuit's construction of section 24-301 is irrelevant to the subsequent construction
of the IDRA. As a result, the Court correctly held that the Act fails to
decree that courts must give the proposed instruction.
C.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE IDRA

A heated contest rages about the role that legislative history plays
in statutory interpretation. Justice White has asserted that "[a]s for
the propriety of using legislative history at all, common sense suggests
that inquiry benefits from reviewing additional information, rather
than ignoring it."167 In contrast, Justice Scalia has argued that courts
should recognize the unreliability of legislative history and refuse to
allow legislative history to have a dispositive effect on statutory
interpretation.

168

Recent decisions in which the Court employed legislative history
as an interpretive tool tie the Congressional records to specific text in
the statute at issue. 1 69 The text of the IDRA itself remains silent on

the issue of jury instructions. Thus, the legislative history regarding
jury instructions contains no statutory reference point. And as the
Court stated, "courts have no authority to enforce a principle gleaned
u7 0
solely from legislative history that has no statutory reference point.'
Certainly, Congress could easily have addressed the issue of jury
instructions in the text of the Act. As the Court noted, the IDRA represents the final product of an exhaustive review of the insanity defense in the federal context. 17 1 The endorsement of the "Lyles
procedure" discussed in the legislative history of the IDRA implies
that Congress knew that most jurisdictions did not provide the jury
with information about the ramifications of an NGI verdict. If ConD.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301U) (1981).
Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 611 n.4 (1991).
Id. at 615-18.
Id.; see also County of Wash., Or. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
Shannon v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (1994) (citing IBEW v. NLRB, 814
F.2d 697, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
171 Id. at 2428.
166
167
168
169
170
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gress had intended to formalize its preference concerning appropriate jury instructions, it had every opportunity to do so. Since
Congress did not issue such a mandate, the Court correctly concluded
that the precept that juries should not concern themselves with the
consequences of their verdicts still holds true under the IDRA.
D.

EMPIUCAL STUDIES

Empirical studies indicate that most jurors understand that an
NGI verdict results in the defendant's involuntary confinement to a
mental hospital. 72 These results remain constant regardless of
whether or not the jury received commitment instructions prior to
deliberations. 173 These studies support the majority's contention that
media attention has raised the public consciousness about the insanity
defense, making the general public aware of the consequences of an
NGI verdict. While the point is not central to the Court's holding,
one of Shannon's main arguments in favor of giving the instruction
rests on his assertion that the general public does not understand the
nature of the verdict. These studies refute that assertion.
One recent study does indicate, however, that the media skews
the public's perception of the insanity defense.' 74 Specifically, the
study claims that the public overestimates the level of use and success
of the insanity defense. 75 Even this study concedes, however, that in
recent years the media has portrayed the insanity defense in a much
more realistic light, abandoning its previous sensationalism.' 7 6 Thus,
the earlier studies indicating that juries correctly assume that NGI acquittees undergo involuntary commitment proceedings subsequent to
trial probably hold more truth today. Additionally, the study asserts
only that the media skews the public perception of the circumstances
which generally give rise to the insanity defense; it does not contend
that the media distorts the public's understanding of the results of a
successful insanity plea.
The dissent argued that if most jurors already understand that a
defendant found NGI will be committed to an, institution, no harm
ensues in reiterating that fact. This statement rings hollow. While
courts rarely know why jurors vote a certain way, the court need not
172

RITA

J. SIMON,

THEJURy AND THE INSANITY DEFENSE 93-94 (1967) (reporting that 93%

ofjurors given the commitment instruction and 91% ofjurors not given the commitment
instruction believed that an NGI acquittee would be confined to a mental hospital after
trial); Grant H. Morris et al., Wither Thou Goest? An Inquiry into Jurors Perceptions of the
Consequences of a Succsful Insanity Defens 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1058, 1068 (1977).
173 SIMON, supra note 172, at 94.
174 See Silver et al., supranote 157.
175 Id. at 67.
176 Id. at 69.
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encourage the jury to consider legal matters outside its province. An
instruction such as the one Shannon proposed will plant the knowledge of the ramifications of an NGI verdict in each juror's mind immediately before deliberation begins. Arguably, this would increase
the possibility of compromise verdicts. 177 The jury might use deliberation to determine whether or not it thinks that the defendant should
go to prison or should get medical treatment. If the jury thinks the
defendant is insane, but also thinks that the defendant is dangerous, it
might return a verdict of guilty notwithstanding its belief in the defendant's insanity. Conversely, if the jury thinks that the defendant
was not insane at the time the defendant committed the crime, but
also thinks that the defendant would benefit more from medical treatment than from prison, it might return a verdict of NGI. Both of
these scenarios represent abuses of power by the jury. An instruction
as to the consequences to the defendant of an NGI verdict given immediately before deliberations begin enhances the possibility that
those consequences will be uppermost in the minds of the jurors at
the start of deliberations.
E.

THE ANALOGY TO JURY NULLIFICATION

As discussed, for a brief period in American history, courts allowed juries to decide the law as well as the facts. 178 This practice had
a twofold effect: (1) it marginalized the role of the judge, who could
explain the law to the jury, but could not force the jury to decide the
case on that basis, and (2) it encouraged juries to decide cases based
on subjective feelings toward the defendant. The Supreme Court cur179
tailed this practice at the end of the nineteenth century.
Due to the shroud of secrecy that surrounds jury deliberations,
however, the jury still possesses the power to return verdicts contrary
to the evidence, even though it no longer possesses the right to do
so.

8 0°

The question whether juries should receive instructions to that

effect has sparked much controversy. Courts generally have resolved
that question in the negative, reasoning that advising the jury of its
power of nullification encourages the jury to return a verdict that attains the result the jury thinks appropriate for the particular
181
defendant.
The question of whether courts should inform the jury of the
177 See Shannon v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (1994).
178 HANS & VIDMAR, supranote 6, at 38. See also supratext accompanying notes 12 to 14.
179 See Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 74 (1895).
180 See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 6, at 40.
181 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 824 (1975) (Quirico, J., dissent-

ing); United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 518-19 (9th Cir. 1972).

1995]

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

1083

consequences of an NGI verdict brings up the same issues as the question of jury nullification-the proper disposition of power between
the judge and the jury, and whether the jury possesses the right to
take potential outcomes into account when reaching a verdict. Since
the Court's decision in Sparf, the role of the jury has been simply to
reach a verdict based on the evidence and the applicable rules of law,
as explained by the judge. 182 The jury must perform this function
without regard to the consequences of its verdict. 183 The Court's decision in Shannon is entirely consistent with this view of the proper function of the jury.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Rules establishing the proper roles of the judge and jury serve an
important function. They maintain the appearance of fairness necessary for the judicial system to work. Cases with identical facts will
hopefully yield identical results, regardless of who is on the jury or
who sits on the bench. When courts encourage the jury to consider
the ramifications of its verdict, the likelihood of this result decreases,
and the judicial system appears arbitrary. Like the principle against
jury nullification and the general proscription against involving the
jury in sentencing (except in certain capital cases), the Court's refusal
to instruct the jury on the consequences of an NGI verdict protects
the integrity of the judicial system.
Naturally, courts should provide as fair a trial for defendants as
possible. The Court's decision in Shannon serves this purpose by allowing for a curative instruction in the face of a misstatement by the
prosecutor or a witness. This compromise addresses the concerns of
all parties involved and may be the best solution to a difficult
problem.
RANDi ELLLAS

182
183

United States v. Fisher, 10 F.3d 115, 121 (3d Cir. 1993).
Id.

